Book: The Science of Ethics
Overview
Leslie Stephen presents a rigorous attempt to place ethics on a scientific and psychological footing, arguing that moral thought and practice should be explained by the nature and motives of human beings rather than by metaphysical axioms or divine commands. He seeks to disentangle the psychology of moral judgment from the lofty abstractions of traditional moralists, examining how sentiments, desires, and social relations produce the distinctions between right and wrong. The book navigates the full range of nineteenth-century debates, from intuitionism and Kantian duty to utilitarian calculation, always returning to a preference for empirical evidence about human nature.
Critique of Ethical Theories
Stephen mounts sustained criticisms of major ethical systems of his day. He challenges appeals to innate moral intuition as insufficiently grounded and too inconsistent to serve as the basis for a science of ethics. He questions the metaphysical certainty claimed by deontological systems and exposes the abstract character of imperatives that do not account for human motives. Utilitarianism receives a nuanced appraisal: its attention to consequences and welfare aligns with an empirical method, yet its reduction of moral value to pleasure and pain is called too narrow. Stephen insists that any satisfactory theory must explain why people care about others and why moral norms command in practice.
Psychology of Morality
Central to Stephen's project is a careful analysis of human motivation. He foregrounds sympathy, social instincts, and a complex of emotions that incline individuals toward benevolence or restraint. Moral approval and disapproval, for him, are outward expressions of inward affective tendencies rather than the discovery of abstract moral facts. Reason plays a coordinating role: it helps to calculate consequences, generalize rules, and control impulsive tendencies, but it does not by itself create moral obligation. Stephen's account highlights how habit, education, and social reinforcement shape moral character and how individual self-interest can be enlarged into genuine regard for others.
Method and the Empirical Approach
Stephen advocates treating ethics as a science in the sense that moral principles should be tested against observations about human conduct and the social conditions that cultivate virtues. He draws on contemporary psychology, sociology, and the evolutionary ideas of his era to explain the origin and development of moral sentiments. Moral rules are seen as adaptive norms that promote social cooperation; their authority depends on their rootedness in human nature and the social benefits they secure. This empirical orientation aims to make moral philosophy both explanatory and practical, guiding education and institutions toward fostering the dispositions that sustain moral life.
Practical Implications and Criticism
From Stephen's perspective, moral improvement is a matter of cultivating sympathetic habits, improving social environments, and using reason to align personal motives with communal welfare. He rejects simplistic appeals to external sanctions or supernatural obligation and instead emphasizes moral cultivation, social reform, and the refinement of sentiments through literature, education, and law. Critics may object that his sentimental and psychological emphasis risks relativism or undervaluing principled constraint, but Stephen attempts to balance feeling and deliberation by showing how stable social norms can emerge from shared human capacities.
Legacy and Relevance
The Science of Ethics stands as a distinctive Victorian effort to reconcile moral thought with emerging scientific outlooks. Its insistence on grounding moral theory in human psychology anticipates later developments in ethical naturalism and moral psychology, and its skepticism about metaphysical certainties resonates with modern anti-foundationalist tendencies. While some conclusions reflect the limitations of nineteenth-century science, the central insight, that understanding human motives is indispensable to moral theory, remains influential for anyone seeking an ethics attentive to how people actually live, feel, and reform themselves and their societies.
Leslie Stephen presents a rigorous attempt to place ethics on a scientific and psychological footing, arguing that moral thought and practice should be explained by the nature and motives of human beings rather than by metaphysical axioms or divine commands. He seeks to disentangle the psychology of moral judgment from the lofty abstractions of traditional moralists, examining how sentiments, desires, and social relations produce the distinctions between right and wrong. The book navigates the full range of nineteenth-century debates, from intuitionism and Kantian duty to utilitarian calculation, always returning to a preference for empirical evidence about human nature.
Critique of Ethical Theories
Stephen mounts sustained criticisms of major ethical systems of his day. He challenges appeals to innate moral intuition as insufficiently grounded and too inconsistent to serve as the basis for a science of ethics. He questions the metaphysical certainty claimed by deontological systems and exposes the abstract character of imperatives that do not account for human motives. Utilitarianism receives a nuanced appraisal: its attention to consequences and welfare aligns with an empirical method, yet its reduction of moral value to pleasure and pain is called too narrow. Stephen insists that any satisfactory theory must explain why people care about others and why moral norms command in practice.
Psychology of Morality
Central to Stephen's project is a careful analysis of human motivation. He foregrounds sympathy, social instincts, and a complex of emotions that incline individuals toward benevolence or restraint. Moral approval and disapproval, for him, are outward expressions of inward affective tendencies rather than the discovery of abstract moral facts. Reason plays a coordinating role: it helps to calculate consequences, generalize rules, and control impulsive tendencies, but it does not by itself create moral obligation. Stephen's account highlights how habit, education, and social reinforcement shape moral character and how individual self-interest can be enlarged into genuine regard for others.
Method and the Empirical Approach
Stephen advocates treating ethics as a science in the sense that moral principles should be tested against observations about human conduct and the social conditions that cultivate virtues. He draws on contemporary psychology, sociology, and the evolutionary ideas of his era to explain the origin and development of moral sentiments. Moral rules are seen as adaptive norms that promote social cooperation; their authority depends on their rootedness in human nature and the social benefits they secure. This empirical orientation aims to make moral philosophy both explanatory and practical, guiding education and institutions toward fostering the dispositions that sustain moral life.
Practical Implications and Criticism
From Stephen's perspective, moral improvement is a matter of cultivating sympathetic habits, improving social environments, and using reason to align personal motives with communal welfare. He rejects simplistic appeals to external sanctions or supernatural obligation and instead emphasizes moral cultivation, social reform, and the refinement of sentiments through literature, education, and law. Critics may object that his sentimental and psychological emphasis risks relativism or undervaluing principled constraint, but Stephen attempts to balance feeling and deliberation by showing how stable social norms can emerge from shared human capacities.
Legacy and Relevance
The Science of Ethics stands as a distinctive Victorian effort to reconcile moral thought with emerging scientific outlooks. Its insistence on grounding moral theory in human psychology anticipates later developments in ethical naturalism and moral psychology, and its skepticism about metaphysical certainties resonates with modern anti-foundationalist tendencies. While some conclusions reflect the limitations of nineteenth-century science, the central insight, that understanding human motives is indispensable to moral theory, remains influential for anyone seeking an ethics attentive to how people actually live, feel, and reform themselves and their societies.
The Science of Ethics
This book is an examination of the philosophical foundations of ethics, critiquing various ethical theories, analyzing human motivation and behavior, and outlining a more empirical approach.
- Publication Year: 1882
- Type: Book
- Genre: Philosophy, Ethics
- Language: English
- View all works by Leslie Stephen on Amazon
Author: Leslie Stephen

More about Leslie Stephen
- Occup.: Author
- From: England
- Other works:
- The Playground of Europe (1871 Book)
- History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century (1876 Book)
- The Life of Samuel Johnson, LL.D. (1878 Biography)
- Alexander Pope (1880 Biography)
- An Agnostic's Apology (1893 Book)
- Studies of a Biographer (1898 Collection of Essays)
- English Literature and Society in the Eighteenth Century (1904 Book)
- Hours in a Library (1905 Collection of Essays)