Utilitarianism: For and Against

Overview

Utilitarianism: For and Against stages a sustained, face-to-face debate between two of the twentieth century's most important moral philosophers. J. J. C. Smart mounts a robust defense of classical act utilitarianism, arguing for an impartial, outcome-focused morality that maximizes overall welfare. Bernard Williams responds with a systematic critique, arguing that utilitarianism undermines central features of moral life by ignoring integrity, personal commitments, and the structure of practical reason.

Smart's defense of utilitarianism

Smart presents utilitarianism as a simple, unified moral theory: right action is determined by the consequences that maximize overall good. He defends act utilitarianism against common objections, insisting that moral rules should not have independent normative weight when their exceptions produce better outcomes. Smart treats many apparent moral constraints as instrumentally grounded: the emotions and rules people rely on often promote utility, but they are not themselves the final moral standard. He argues that demandingness and impartiality, though counterintuitive, are required by a consistent commitment to maximizing welfare and that apparent conflicts with moral intuitions do not outweigh the theory's explanatory power.

Williams's critique: integrity and alienation

Williams challenges utilitarianism by focusing on the moral psychology of agents rather than abstract aggregation. He introduces the charge that utilitarianism can force agents to violate their deepest commitments and projects, thereby compromising their integrity. Through vivid examples where an agent must perform a heinous act to produce better aggregate outcomes, Williams argues that utilitarian demands can alienate an agent from their moral emotions and personal identity. Rather than merely asking what consequences are best, moral judgment must take seriously how decisions bear on an agent's moral character and commitments, which utilitarian aggregation flattens and misrecognizes.

Negative responsibility, demandingness, and personal projects

Both writers engage issues of responsibility and the breadth of moral obligation. Williams emphasizes that utilitarianism's principle of outcome-responsibility extends blame and praise beyond an agent's direct choices, rendering omissions morally equivalent to commissions in ways that many find intolerable. He also stresses that the theory's demandingness, its readiness to override personal projects for the sake of aggregate good, threatens the meaningfulness of moral life. Smart concedes that utilitarianism requires severe impartiality but treats demandingness as an unavoidable implication of a truthful moral theory; he attempts to show that concerns about alienation and integrity are psychological reactions rather than decisive philosophical refutations.

Structure, tone, and legacy

The book follows a dialogical structure: Smart sets out his defense, Williams replies with systematic objections, and both offer rejoinders that sharpen the philosophical stakes. The exchange is argumentative yet approachable, bringing abstract ethical theory into contact with concrete dilemmas. The debate crystallized enduring tensions in moral philosophy, between impartial welfare maximization and the moral significance of persons' convictions and attachments, and has shaped subsequent work on moral psychology, the limits of consequentialism, and the ethics of integrity.