"An utterance can have Intentionality, just as a belief has Intentionality, but whereas the Intentionality of the belief is intrinsic the Intentionality of the utterance is derived"
About this Quote
John Searle's quote addresses an essential distinction in the philosophy of mind and language regarding the concept of "Intentionality". Intentionality is the capacity of the mind to be directed at or about something-- items, residential or commercial properties, or states of affairs. This idea is essential in comprehending how ideas and interactions can connect to or represent the world.
Searle draws a distinction between the Intentionality of beliefs and utterances. He suggests that beliefs have intrinsic Intentionality. This indicates that beliefs are inherently about or directed towards something without needing any external interpretive structure. When an individual thinks something, that belief is instantly connected to the things or situation it worries. For example, if someone thinks that "the sky is blue", their belief directly refers to the sky's perceived color as a frame of mind pointing to an aspect of truth.
On the other hand, Searle argues that the Intentionality of utterances is obtained. Utterances are acts of speech or interaction, and their Intentionality depends on the underlying mental states of the speakers and the interpretative context provided by the language and social conventions. In this sense, an utterance like "the sky is blue" acquires its Intentionality from the speaker's beliefs or intentions, along with the shared understanding between speaker and listener. An utterance may not inherently contain significance; instead, it requires analysis based upon the speaker's intent and the linguistic and cultural background of the communication.
The obtained Intentionality of utterances highlights language's intricacy and the active role interpreters play in understanding and associating meaning. This difference highlights the connection between mind and language and the need of context, convention, and shared understanding in interaction. Searle's difference hence highlights the layered nature of meaning-making and the complex link between inner mental states and outward expressions in human interaction.
