"Disapproval of homosexuality cannot justify invading the houses, hearts and minds of citizens who choose to live their lives differently"
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“Invading” is the verb that gives Blackmun’s line its steel. It recasts moral disapproval not as a private opinion but as an aggressive act of the state: a breach, a trespass, a raid. In one stroke, he collapses the distance between policing bedrooms and policing thought, arguing that what starts as condemnation quickly becomes coercion. The phrasing “houses, hearts and minds” deliberately widens the blast radius. It’s not just about where people sleep, but where they belong, what they feel, and what they’re allowed to believe about themselves. That escalation is the point: once the government claims authority to punish intimacy, it effectively claims authority to reshape identity.
The line is built on a distinctly constitutional instinct, even when it’s not citing doctrine: the state needs something sturdier than revulsion. “Disapproval” is framed as thin, subjective, culturally contingent. It may be common; it’s not a warrant. Blackmun’s intent is to strip “majority discomfort” of its usual camouflage as public morality and expose it as an insufficient basis for law.
Context matters: Blackmun, a Supreme Court justice, spent his career watching rights debates turn on whether certain lives counted as fully private, fully dignified, fully protected. The sentence reads like a dissent sharpened into a moral syllogism, anticipating the arc from Bowers-era criminalization toward Lawrence-era liberty. Its subtext is blunt: the law can regulate conduct, but when it starts regulating “different” lives, it isn’t maintaining order; it’s enforcing conformity.
The line is built on a distinctly constitutional instinct, even when it’s not citing doctrine: the state needs something sturdier than revulsion. “Disapproval” is framed as thin, subjective, culturally contingent. It may be common; it’s not a warrant. Blackmun’s intent is to strip “majority discomfort” of its usual camouflage as public morality and expose it as an insufficient basis for law.
Context matters: Blackmun, a Supreme Court justice, spent his career watching rights debates turn on whether certain lives counted as fully private, fully dignified, fully protected. The sentence reads like a dissent sharpened into a moral syllogism, anticipating the arc from Bowers-era criminalization toward Lawrence-era liberty. Its subtext is blunt: the law can regulate conduct, but when it starts regulating “different” lives, it isn’t maintaining order; it’s enforcing conformity.
Quote Details
| Topic | Human Rights |
|---|---|
| Source | Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), dissenting opinion of Justice Harry A. Blackmun (dissenting opinion containing the cited language). |
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