"Ending racial discrimination in jury selection can be accomplished only by eliminating peremptory challenges entirely"
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Marshall’s line lands like a judicial ultimatum: if you’re serious about fair juries, stop pretending you can surgically remove bias from a tool built to smuggle it in. Peremptory challenges were sold as a lubricant for the courtroom, a way to help both sides feel the jury is “acceptable” without having to prove misconduct. Marshall flips that convenience into indictment. The very feature that makes peremptories attractive - discretion without explanation - is exactly what makes them an ideal delivery system for racial exclusion.
The specific intent is bluntly reformist, but also strategic. Marshall isn’t offering another incremental test or procedural patch; he’s arguing that discrimination in jury selection is not a glitch in the system, it’s a predictable outcome of it. The subtext is a warning about performative compliance. Even after Batson v. Kentucky (1986) nominally barred race-based strikes, lawyers could reach the same result through “race-neutral” pretexts: demeanor, neighborhood, “attitude,” the kind of squishy rationales that survive because trial courts defer and appellate courts hesitate to second-guess.
Context matters: Marshall’s career ran from dismantling Jim Crow as an NAACP lawyer to watching the criminal legal system repackage exclusion in more polite language. A jury is supposed to embody citizenship; excluding people from it has always been a way to police who counts as part of the polity. Marshall’s rhetorical power is in refusing the comforting idea that bias can be managed by better etiquette. He suggests the only cure is structural: remove the discretionary escape hatch, or keep accepting juries that look “random” only after someone has curated them.
The specific intent is bluntly reformist, but also strategic. Marshall isn’t offering another incremental test or procedural patch; he’s arguing that discrimination in jury selection is not a glitch in the system, it’s a predictable outcome of it. The subtext is a warning about performative compliance. Even after Batson v. Kentucky (1986) nominally barred race-based strikes, lawyers could reach the same result through “race-neutral” pretexts: demeanor, neighborhood, “attitude,” the kind of squishy rationales that survive because trial courts defer and appellate courts hesitate to second-guess.
Context matters: Marshall’s career ran from dismantling Jim Crow as an NAACP lawyer to watching the criminal legal system repackage exclusion in more polite language. A jury is supposed to embody citizenship; excluding people from it has always been a way to police who counts as part of the polity. Marshall’s rhetorical power is in refusing the comforting idea that bias can be managed by better etiquette. He suggests the only cure is structural: remove the discretionary escape hatch, or keep accepting juries that look “random” only after someone has curated them.
Quote Details
| Topic | Justice |
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