"From the material point of view the proposal is unacceptable, for France, without further territory in Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power, and become subordinate to German policy"

Edward Grey, British Foreign Secretary during the early twentieth century, addresses the implications of a diplomatic proposal concerning the postwar status of France. He evaluates the consequences not merely in territorial terms, but from a broader material perspective, suggesting that national strength and international standing encompass more than just the physical boundaries of a state. France, already weakened by losses during the conflict, risked being subjected to terms so harsh that her capacity for self-determination and participation on the European stage would be existentially threatened.

Grey emphasizes that even if France retained all her existing territory, her economic and military capabilities could be so severely damaged that her role as a Great Power, one of those nations with the ability to assert itself across Europe, would effectively vanish. This loss would not be simply symbolic. Great Power status at the time conferred both tangible and intangible benefits: influence over continental politics, the ability to protect national interests, and the respect or fear of other states. Depriving France of these by means other than territorial reduction would nevertheless render her vulnerable, potentially dependent on, or dominated by, the will of stronger neighbors.

Specifically, Grey warns of the likelihood that, thus diminished, France would find herself compelled to submit to German policy. The broader implication is a critique of punitive settlements that, while appearing restrained in terms of territorial demands, nonetheless undermine a nation’s sovereignty by eroding its capacity to act independently. Grey sees such an outcome as unjust and destabilizing for the balance of power that underpins European peace. His argument reflects a principle of maintaining equilibrium, not necessarily out of benevolence, but as a preventive measure against the resentment and unrest bred by the humiliation and subordination of great states, especially one with France’s history and national character.