"Osama bin Laden is going after us to get us out of the region, so he can deal with the regimes that he sees in the region, or replace them with purists"
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Brent Scowcroft captures a core feature of al-Qaeda’s strategy: the United States was a means to a local end. Osama bin Laden’s primary target was not American society itself but the American presence and influence that, in his view, propped up regimes he labeled apostate. By striking the United States, he sought either to force a withdrawal from the Middle East or to lure it into actions that would delegitimize its partners and galvanize insurgents. Once external support was weakened, he believed he could topple regional governments and replace them with “purist” rule rooted in his Salafi-jihadist vision.
This logic grew from grievances articulated in bin Laden’s 1996 and 1998 declarations, which railed against U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia after the Gulf War, sanctions on Iraq, and support for Israel and authoritarian allies. The tactical innovation was to elevate the “far enemy” to weaken the “near enemy.” Spectacular attacks served several goals at once: signaling resolve, drawing disproportionate responses, inflaming anti-American sentiment, and aiding recruitment. Scowcroft, a realist steeped in power politics and regional balance, reads this as a trap: if Washington overreacts or launches broad wars, it risks eroding the very state order bin Laden sought to dismantle.
The word “purists” matters. It points to an aspiration not merely to change rulers but to impose a stripped-down, absolutist model of governance, intolerant of pluralism and local religious traditions. That vision threatened monarchies and republics alike, from Saudi Arabia to Egypt and beyond, all of which al-Qaeda dismissed as corrupt and Western-dependent.
Scowcroft issued this kind of warning as he opposed the Iraq invasion in 2002, arguing it would distract from counterterrorism, fracture coalitions, and destabilize the region in ways that advantaged jihadists. His analysis underscores a strategic paradox: defeating a movement like al-Qaeda requires denying it the upheaval it seeks, preserving regional legitimacy, and avoiding steps that transform a provocation into a self-fulfilling prophecy.
This logic grew from grievances articulated in bin Laden’s 1996 and 1998 declarations, which railed against U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia after the Gulf War, sanctions on Iraq, and support for Israel and authoritarian allies. The tactical innovation was to elevate the “far enemy” to weaken the “near enemy.” Spectacular attacks served several goals at once: signaling resolve, drawing disproportionate responses, inflaming anti-American sentiment, and aiding recruitment. Scowcroft, a realist steeped in power politics and regional balance, reads this as a trap: if Washington overreacts or launches broad wars, it risks eroding the very state order bin Laden sought to dismantle.
The word “purists” matters. It points to an aspiration not merely to change rulers but to impose a stripped-down, absolutist model of governance, intolerant of pluralism and local religious traditions. That vision threatened monarchies and republics alike, from Saudi Arabia to Egypt and beyond, all of which al-Qaeda dismissed as corrupt and Western-dependent.
Scowcroft issued this kind of warning as he opposed the Iraq invasion in 2002, arguing it would distract from counterterrorism, fracture coalitions, and destabilize the region in ways that advantaged jihadists. His analysis underscores a strategic paradox: defeating a movement like al-Qaeda requires denying it the upheaval it seeks, preserving regional legitimacy, and avoiding steps that transform a provocation into a self-fulfilling prophecy.
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| Topic | War |
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