"The lawyer's truth is not Truth, but consistency or a consistent expediency"
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Thoreau draws a sharp distinction between abstract, philosophical, or moral truth and the kind of “truth” maintained by the legal system. He suggests that for lawyers, truth is less about objective reality or ethical rectitude and more about maintaining a logical and strategic coherence within arguments and cases. The practice of law, in Thoreau’s view, revolves around the construction and defense of positions based on established rules, precedent, and rationale rather than genuine adherence to an underlying universal truth.
In the legal context, “truth” often becomes a matter of crafting persuasive narratives that align with evidence, statutes, and precedents rather than uncovering an ultimate, unbiased reality. Lawyers typically work within the system’s boundaries, aiming for consistency in their logic and conformity to procedural standards. The art of advocacy involves strategically selecting facts, emphasizing certain aspects over others, and sometimes even omitting inconvenient realities to construct the most compelling case for a client. This pursuit is guided less by a search for moral or metaphysical truth and more by tactical effectiveness or “consistent expediency”, a practical approach to achieving desired outcomes.
Thoreau’s observation carries a subtle but powerful critique: that legal processes, for all their apparent impartiality and structure, can prioritize expedience and formal coherence over a genuine quest for what is right or true. Consistency within the law does not necessarily guarantee justice or veracity but merely ensures the system functions predictably. Lawyers are trained to uphold these internal consistencies, sometimes at the expense of broader principles. Thus, the “truth” in law can diverge dramatically from what one might regard as Truth in ethical, humanistic, or philosophical terms. Thoreau’s reflection encourages skepticism toward equating legal resolution with ultimate justice, reminding us that institutional processes often substitute procedural regularity for a deeper, more uncomfortable reality.
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