"We cannot lightly allow the perpetrator of a serious crime to go free simply because that person believed his actions were reasonable and necessary to prevent some perceived harm"
About this Quote
Law has little patience for self-authored permission slips. Wachtler’s line draws a bright, almost impatient boundary between private conviction and public justification: in a system built to arbitrate harm, you don’t get to preempt the court by declaring yourself the emergency.
The specific intent is prosecutorial in spirit even if it comes from the bench. He’s shoring up the principle that a defendant’s subjective belief - however sincere, however narratively compelling - can’t be a universal solvent for criminal liability. The phrasing does quiet work: “cannot lightly allow” signals institutional gravity, “serious crime” closes the door on trivialities, and “perceived harm” punctures the defendant’s moral certainty. The harm is not necessarily real; it’s a story the perpetrator tells himself.
The subtext is a rebuke of necessity-style defenses and vigilantism, especially the sort that arrives draped in moral panic. It’s also a warning about the contagion effect: if “reasonable and necessary” is defined by the actor, the law becomes a competition of competing fears, where the most vivid paranoia wins. Wachtler anticipates the rhetorical move that tries to smuggle a private moral calculus into the courtroom and launder it as civic duty.
Contextually, this sits in the late-20th-century American legal landscape where “crime prevention” and “self-defense” narratives increasingly collided with public anxiety, political pressure, and sensational cases. The quote defends legitimacy itself: courts survive by insisting that justification is a shared standard, not a personal hunch with consequences.
The specific intent is prosecutorial in spirit even if it comes from the bench. He’s shoring up the principle that a defendant’s subjective belief - however sincere, however narratively compelling - can’t be a universal solvent for criminal liability. The phrasing does quiet work: “cannot lightly allow” signals institutional gravity, “serious crime” closes the door on trivialities, and “perceived harm” punctures the defendant’s moral certainty. The harm is not necessarily real; it’s a story the perpetrator tells himself.
The subtext is a rebuke of necessity-style defenses and vigilantism, especially the sort that arrives draped in moral panic. It’s also a warning about the contagion effect: if “reasonable and necessary” is defined by the actor, the law becomes a competition of competing fears, where the most vivid paranoia wins. Wachtler anticipates the rhetorical move that tries to smuggle a private moral calculus into the courtroom and launder it as civic duty.
Contextually, this sits in the late-20th-century American legal landscape where “crime prevention” and “self-defense” narratives increasingly collided with public anxiety, political pressure, and sensational cases. The quote defends legitimacy itself: courts survive by insisting that justification is a shared standard, not a personal hunch with consequences.
Quote Details
| Topic | Justice |
|---|---|
| Source | Help us find the source |
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