"You would have thought that after 9/11 the president would have finished the job in Afghanistan, and kept the focus on capturing Bin Laden and his al-Qaeda deputies, but he and his team gave top priority to their original plan to invade Iraq"

Bill Nelson's quote provides a vital viewpoint on the U.S. diplomacy decisions in the consequences of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. The statement highlights a perceived misstep by the U.S. federal government under President George W. Bush in the early 2000s. Nelson suggests that the sensible and awaited action to the 9/11 attacks would have been to concentrate efforts on stabilizing Afghanistan, getting rid of al-Qaeda, and particularly recording Osama bin Laden, the mastermind behind the attacks.

The expression "finished the task in Afghanistan" suggests that there was an expectation for a focused and thorough military and tactical operation to bring back stability to Afghanistan and get rid of terrorist risks emanating from the region. Afghanistan was the base for al-Qaeda under the Taliban routine, and many believed it was vital to dismantle their operations there to avoid future attacks. However, Nelson points out that rather than combining efforts in Afghanistan, the Bush administration chose to pivot towards Iraq.

By saying "he and his team gave leading concern to their original plan to attack Iraq", Nelson critiques the Bush administration for diverting resources and attention away from Afghanistan. This shift is frequently considered as part of a broader neoconservative program that included routine modification in Iraq, justified publicly by assertions of weapons of mass damage and links to terrorism. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 marked a significant allocation of military and diplomatic resources, which many argue might have been more effectively used in Afghanistan.

Nelson's quote shows a more comprehensive debate about U.S. diplomacy priorities and strategies. Critics argue that the concentrate on Iraq led to the disregard of important goals in Afghanistan, allowing al-Qaeda and the Taliban to reemerge gradually. Overall, Nelson indicates that the subsequent issues faced in both Iraq and Afghanistan were, in part, effects of this strategic decision, which hindered the success of anti-terrorism efforts during that period.