Essay: Famine, Affluence, and Morality

Overview
Peter Singer argues that affluent individuals have a demanding moral obligation to prevent suffering and death from poverty-related causes such as lack of food, shelter, and medical care. He challenges common distinctions between duty and charity, and between obligations to near versus distant others. Singer frames the moral question around the preventability of serious harm: if one can stop something very bad from happening without sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, one is morally required to do so.
The essay is driven by a simple ethical principle and a memorable thought experiment, and it draws out practical consequences for how people ought to use their disposable income. Singer insists that moral reasoning should not be distorted by proximity, nationality, or emotionally comforting distinctions that reduce obligations to the needy.

Central Principle and Thought Experiment
Singer introduces a principle roughly: if it is in someone's power to prevent something bad from happening without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, that person ought, morally, to do it. He tests this principle with the example of a child drowning in a shallow pond: if one can save the child at little cost (ruining a pair of shoes), failing to do so would be immoral. The analogy is extended from a single child to countless victims of famine and disease who are equally preventable with modest sacrifices by affluent people.
This argument rests on a consequentialist intuition that the moral weight of preventing suffering is not diminished by distance or by the number of victims. Singer rejects the idea that being physically distant or lacking direct emotional ties weakens moral obligation, insisting instead that moral reasoning should be impartial and responsive to foreseeable consequences.

Implications for Individual Behavior
Singer draws a stark line between ordinary charitable gestures and what he sees as genuine moral duty. Many behaviors treated as supererogatory, donating significant portions of income to effective relief, become obligatory under his principle. He suggests affluent people should give much more of their disposable income to effective relief organizations until giving further would involve sacrificing something of comparable moral importance.
Singer acknowledges practical complexities but argues they do not negate the underlying obligation. He recommends prioritizing interventions that produce the greatest reduction in suffering per unit of resource, emphasizing effectiveness and the moral urgency of preventing avoidable death and severe deprivation.

Common Objections and Singer's Replies
A frequent objection is that the principle is unreasonably demanding, requiring people to give up too much of their standard of living. Singer responds by distinguishing between an ideal moral obligation and morally permissible compromises in nonideal circumstances; however, he insists that the basic principle still requires far more generosity than typical social norms allow. Others argue for the moral relevance of personal projects, family obligations, or rights to property; Singer counters that while such considerations matter, they rarely justify ignoring massive, preventable suffering.
Critics also question the effectiveness of aid and worry about unintended consequences. Singer emphasizes selecting well-evaluated organizations and policies, and he frames his claim as a moral requirement to act where doing good is clear and efficacious rather than a blanket endorsement of all forms of aid.

Legacy and Influence
The essay provoked wide debate about the nature of charitable obligation and the moral responsibilities of the wealthy. It is a foundational text for movements that stress effective giving and impartial concern for distant strangers, influencing both academic ethics and public discourse on philanthropy. Its force lies in reframing ordinary acts of giving as moral choices with urgent consequences, pushing readers to reassess comfortable complacency in the face of preventable suffering.