Book: Naming and Necessity

Overview

Naming and Necessity presents a radical rethinking of how names and natural kind terms secure reference. Saul Kripke challenges dominant descriptivist theories that tie the meaning of a name to a bundle of associated descriptions, arguing instead that names rigidly designate the same object in every possible world where that object exists. The book reshaped debates about reference, meaning, and modality by separating semantics from epistemology and insisting that metaphysical necessity is not confined to what can be known a priori.

Descriptivism and its limits

Kripke examines the classical view, often associated with Frege and Russell, that a proper name covertly abbreviates a set of descriptions known or believed by speakers. He shows that descriptivism struggles with cases where the associated descriptions are false or incomplete yet reference is preserved. Examples include historical misidentifications and ordinary uses of names where speakers possess only partial or erroneous information. From these observations Kripke argues that descriptive content cannot be the primary source of a name's reference.

Rigid designators and modal consequences

Central to Kripke's account is the notion of a rigid designator: a term that picks out the same object in every possible world in which that object exists. Proper names and many natural-kind terms function as rigid designators, so identity statements involving them express necessary truths when true, though they may be known only empirically. This move yields a striking separation between modal status and epistemic access: a true identity statement like "Hesperus is Phosphorus" is necessarily true, even if discovered empirically, because both names rigidly designate the same planet.

Causal-historical theory of reference

To explain how names latch onto objects without reference to descriptions, Kripke develops a causal-historical model. A name is introduced by an initial baptism or dubbing that fixes a referent; subsequent uses transmit reference along a causal chain of communication. Speakers can refer correctly even with minimal or mistaken beliefs about the referent because the chain, rather than descriptive content, secures the link between word and world. This account accounts for reference in scientific and everyday contexts and explains how terms can remain stable across error and ignorance.

Necessary a posteriori and contingent a priori

One of the most influential claims is the existence of necessary a posteriori truths and the possibility of contingent a priori truths. Kripke argues that empirical discoveries can yield necessary truths about natural kinds, "Water is H2O" expresses a necessary identity that was learned empirically. Conversely, certain stipulations of meaning could yield contingent truths known a priori, though Kripke treats such cases more cautiously. These distinctions force philosophers to rethink long-standing links between necessity and a priori knowledge.

Impact and controversies

Naming and Necessity transformed philosophy of language and metaphysics, provoking extensive debate. Critics have defended refined descriptivist models, developed two-dimensional semantics to reconcile epistemic and metaphysical intuitions, or questioned the universality of rigid designation. Supporters credit Kripke with clarifying how language connects to the world and with revitalizing work on modality, reference, and natural kinds. The lectures continue to be a touchstone for discussions about how words relate to objects, how identity and necessity interact, and how epistemic practices shape but do not determine semantic facts.