Book: On Guerrilla Warfare

Background
"On Guerrilla Warfare" was published in 1937 as China faced full-scale invasion by Japan. Mao Zedong drew on Communist experience in the 1920s and 1930s to articulate how irregular forces could resist a conventionally superior enemy. The text frames guerrilla struggle not as isolated raids but as part of a sustained national resistance that must be organized, political, and adaptable to local conditions.
Mao situates guerrilla warfare within a broader strategic horizon, stressing that it is one phase of a protracted conflict. The objective is not merely survival but to erode the enemy's strength, mobilize the populace, and create the conditions for conventional counteroffensives. The book links military practice to revolutionary goals by making political mobilization central to military success.

Core Principles
Guerrilla warfare rests on mobility, surprise, and intimate knowledge of the terrain. Small units avoid direct confrontation with superior forces, striking where the enemy is vulnerable and dissolving before a counterattack. Success depends on fluidity rather than fixed frontlines, turning the local population into the principal source of intelligence, recruits, and logistical support.
Mao emphasizes patience and the use of time as a strategic resource. He outlines a progression from strategic defensive to balance and eventual strategic offensive, arguing that initial weakness can be transformed into strength through sustained harassment, political work, and attrition. The emphasis on political resolve and long-term perspective distinguishes his approach from purely tactical manuals.

Organization and Tactics
Organization must be simple, flexible, and rooted in local society. Guerrilla units operate from base areas that provide sanctuaries, training grounds, and political schools. Command structures are decentralized enough to exploit initiative but linked by common doctrine and political leadership to maintain coherence and discipline.
Tactics include ambushes, sabotage, raids, and hit-and-run attacks aimed at supply lines, isolated garrisons, and collaborators. Logistics rely on local resources and civilian networks rather than extended supply chains. Intelligence and counterintelligence are presented as crucial, with guerrillas relying on the masses for information while protecting themselves through political legitimacy and discipline.

Political-Military Integration
Political work is inseparable from military action. Winning popular support is both a moral imperative and a practical necessity, as civilians provide shelter, recruits, and resources. Mao insists that guerrillas must operate with respect for the people, correct abuses, and build mass organizations to sustain the struggle and prepare for governance.
The leadership role of the Communist Party is central: political education, propaganda, and disciplinary measures ensure that military activity advances broader social and revolutionary objectives. Military victories are seen as hollow without consolidation through political reforms, land policies, and institutions that bind the movement to the populace.

Legacy and Influence
Mao's synthesis became a model for anti-colonial and revolutionary movements worldwide, influencing insurgent strategy throughout the twentieth century. Its combination of tactical flexibility, protracted warfare, and political mobilization offered a blueprint for weaker forces confronting stronger states or occupiers.
Critics note that the approach depends on specific social and geographic conditions, particularly widespread peasant support and permissive terrain, and can lead to protracted suffering. Nevertheless, the work's enduring influence lies in reframing irregular warfare as a comprehensive strategy that fuses military action with political construction, offering lessons on endurance, adaptability, and the centrality of popular legitimacy.