"How much easier is it to be generous than just"

Junius’s remark, “How much easier is it to be generous than just,” invites a nuanced exploration of the nature of virtue and the complexities of moral action. Generosity is often a warm and welcome trait, associated with kindness, benevolence, and the willingness to give or forgive beyond what is strictly required. Acts of generosity, whether gifting material possessions, time, or forgiveness, tend to earn societal approval and personal satisfaction. The effort, while meaningful, is typically accompanied by the pleasant feeling of having done something good or considerate. Generosity, therefore, usually comes with positive feedback and is less likely to provoke hostility or resentment.

Justice, on the other hand, demands more than kindness; it requires impartiality, adherence to principle, and sometimes, uncomfortable decisions. To be just one must weigh circumstances objectively, apply rules or moral law consistently, and sometimes deny oneself or others what is desired. Unlike generosity, which can be dispensed at one’s discretion, justice obliges a person to consider what is fair or deserved regardless of personal sentiment. It is harder to be just because justice may require saying no to favored individuals, standing against prevailing opinion, or enforcing consequences that are necessary but unpopular.

Junius points to a moral paradox, people often find it easier to exceed duty by offering gifts than to simply do what duty requires. The implications stretch beyond personal relationships, touching on society, governance, and leadership. It is temptingly simple to solve problems with magnanimity, dispensing favors or indulgences, than to uphold impartial justice, which may cause discomfort or demand sacrifice. The observation critiques human nature’s preference for the applause that generous acts elicit, while quietly reminding us that real integrity, a true mark of character, lies in the more difficult, often thankless adherence to justice. Ultimately, Junius suggests that the ultimate trial of morality is not in what we give extra, but in what we owe and must fairly provide.