"One is often guilty by being too just"

Pierre Corneille’s observation that one is often guilty by being too just speaks to the complexities and paradoxes of human interactions and societal expectations. Justice, an ideal most societies strive for, is commonly perceived as a virtue, a cornerstone upon which fairness and equality rest. However, Corneille suggests that unwavering commitment to justice, without the tempering influence of mercy, empathy, or pragmatism, might inadvertently cause harm or conflict.

Human affairs rarely unfold in strict binaries of right and wrong; circumstances, motivations, and needs often muddy the clarity of any given situation. By adhering rigidly and dispassionately to rules of justice, individuals may forfeit compassion, failing to take into account mitigating circumstances or the spirit behind a law or custom. In everyday life, relationships depend on forgiveness, leniency, and understanding; unyielding justice can damage trust and warmth between people. A parent who disciplines children solely by the letter of the rules, never allowing for errors or growth, risks alienating them. A leader who applies the law with no margin for mercy courts resentment and alienation among those governed.

Societies themselves build in mechanisms of pardon, recognizing that justice administered without exception can lead to cruelty or disproportionate suffering. The deeply just can sometimes be perceived as cold, rigid, or even self-righteous, making themselves targets of resentment from those around them. Furthermore, systemic application of absolute justice ignores the inequities and inconsistencies that arise in real life.

Corneille’s insight exposes the danger in idolizing justice to the exclusion of all else, highlighting the value of moderation, flexibility, and humanity in social conduct. Balancing justice with understanding and mercy prevents justice from becoming another form of injustice, where the rigorous pursuit of what is right blinds individuals to what is kind, effective, or wise.