"There are only two cases in which war is just: first, in order to resist the aggression of an enemy, and second, in order to help an ally who has been attacked"
About this Quote
Montesquieu trims “just war” down to two narrow doorways and slams the rest shut. In an era when European monarchs treated conflict as a kind of dynastic housekeeping, the line reads like an attempted moral firewall: no wars for glory, no wars for territory, no wars to “teach” rivals a lesson. The only acceptable triggers are reactive ones - self-defense and the defense of someone already hit. That structure matters. By making justice dependent on aggression already committed, he denies rulers the luxury of preventive war dressed up as virtue. War, in this frame, is not a policy tool; it’s an emergency response.
The subtext is aimed as much at domestic power as at foreign enemies. If the state can claim “justice” for any campaign it chooses, the executive becomes morally uncheckable. Montesquieu’s wider project in The Spirit of the Laws is to domesticate power through limits, procedures, and separation; this quote extends that temperament to international violence. It’s an early liberal attempt to bind sovereigns to reasons that are legible to others, not just flattering to themselves.
The second clause - helping an attacked ally - quietly acknowledges a world of entanglements. It grants solidarity without opening the floodgates: you may join a war, but only as a response to a clear wrong. It’s a principle that anticipates collective security while warning how easily “allies” can become pretexts. Montesquieu’s realism is that states will always have interests; his gamble is that they can be forced to argue within constraints.
The subtext is aimed as much at domestic power as at foreign enemies. If the state can claim “justice” for any campaign it chooses, the executive becomes morally uncheckable. Montesquieu’s wider project in The Spirit of the Laws is to domesticate power through limits, procedures, and separation; this quote extends that temperament to international violence. It’s an early liberal attempt to bind sovereigns to reasons that are legible to others, not just flattering to themselves.
The second clause - helping an attacked ally - quietly acknowledges a world of entanglements. It grants solidarity without opening the floodgates: you may join a war, but only as a response to a clear wrong. It’s a principle that anticipates collective security while warning how easily “allies” can become pretexts. Montesquieu’s realism is that states will always have interests; his gamble is that they can be forced to argue within constraints.
Quote Details
| Topic | War |
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