"Namely, we have no right to believe a thing true because everybody says so unless there are good grounds for believing that some one person at least has the means of knowing what is true, and is speaking the truth so far as he knows it"
About this Quote
Popularity is not a reason. A belief does not earn the dignity of truth simply because it is widely repeated. Clifford presses a moral point: we have responsibilities as believers, and credulity borrowed from the crowd is an abdication of duty. Beliefs lead to actions, and actions affect others; to believe on mere say-so is to risk harming real people. That ethic anchors his larger argument from The Ethics of Belief, where he condemns the shipowner who quiets his doubts and sends passengers to sea. The wrong begins not at the wreck but at the first unearned assent.
The remedy is not solitary skepticism but responsible reliance. Testimony can justify belief, yet only when it can be traced to those with the means of knowing and with a commitment to speak as truly as they can. Clifford sketches two conditions: competence and sincerity. Competence demands access to evidence and mastery of methods suited to the question. Sincerity demands that the speaker not overstate, conceal, or pretend certainty beyond what the evidence warrants. His phrase "so far as he knows it" signals fallibilism: even trustworthy experts can be mistaken, but their honest limitations are part of what makes deference rational.
This standard undercuts herd confidence while justifying trust in genuine expertise. The fact that everybody says so has no weight unless there is a lineage from a real knower to the chorus. In science, that lineage is secured by observation, experiment, and peer scrutiny; in courts, by witnesses under oath and cross-examination. In our age of viral claims, bots, and echo chambers, Clifford’s rule is a practical tool: ask who could actually know, how they know, and whether their words track the limits of their knowledge. Deference to consensus is sensible only when the consensus is an echo of many competent, honest knowers, not a hall of mirrors. Ethics begins at the gate of belief by demanding provenance, method, and candor.
The remedy is not solitary skepticism but responsible reliance. Testimony can justify belief, yet only when it can be traced to those with the means of knowing and with a commitment to speak as truly as they can. Clifford sketches two conditions: competence and sincerity. Competence demands access to evidence and mastery of methods suited to the question. Sincerity demands that the speaker not overstate, conceal, or pretend certainty beyond what the evidence warrants. His phrase "so far as he knows it" signals fallibilism: even trustworthy experts can be mistaken, but their honest limitations are part of what makes deference rational.
This standard undercuts herd confidence while justifying trust in genuine expertise. The fact that everybody says so has no weight unless there is a lineage from a real knower to the chorus. In science, that lineage is secured by observation, experiment, and peer scrutiny; in courts, by witnesses under oath and cross-examination. In our age of viral claims, bots, and echo chambers, Clifford’s rule is a practical tool: ask who could actually know, how they know, and whether their words track the limits of their knowledge. Deference to consensus is sensible only when the consensus is an echo of many competent, honest knowers, not a hall of mirrors. Ethics begins at the gate of belief by demanding provenance, method, and candor.
Quote Details
| Topic | Truth |
|---|---|
| Source | William K. Clifford, "The Ethics of Belief" (essay, 1877); reprinted in Lectures and Essays (1879). See the essay for the passage on belief and evidence. |
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