"It is a monstrous thing that I will say, but I will say it all the same: I find in many things more restraint and order in my morals than in my opinions, and my lust less depraved than my reason"

Michel de Montaigne’s observation reveals a striking honesty about the nature of human self-awareness, particularly the tension between instinct, intellect, and moral conduct. On the surface, it seems paradoxical: one might assume that reason, the faculty often associated with logic and virtue, should be more refined and orderly than the more visceral appetites or passions. Montaigne overturns this assumption by suggesting the opposite; that his moral conduct, that is, his behavior and how he restrains himself, displays more discipline than his intellectual stances and speculations. Furthermore, he argues that his desires, his “lust,” are less corrupted or “depraved” than the wanderings of his own reasoning mind.

Beneath this sentiment lies the acknowledgment that ideas themselves can venture into extremes and uncertainties much more easily than desires or deeds. While physical impulses may be subjected to social norms, legal structures, and personal guilt, thoughts run free, encountering fewer limits. One can imagine or reason almost anything, including what would be unthinkable or unacceptable to enact in practice; therefore, the realm of speculation is inherently less “ordered” or restrained than actual behavior.

Montaigne underscores the potential dangers of unchecked intellectual liberty. His “opinions” are more wayward, possibly even more capable of leading to corruption than his wants and appetites. This runs contrary to the faith of his era (and perhaps ours) in the sufficiency of reason as a guide to virtue. Reason, for Montaigne, can rationalize vice as well as virtue, and it is sometimes precisely the cleverest minds that are the most adept at self-deception.

Ultimately, this insight is self-effacing and humble. By placing the faults of reason above those of passion, Montaigne calls for skepticism about the autonomy and purity of the intellect, advocating instead for an ethical self-discipline that is aware of reason’s ability to justify almost anything, both noble and monstrous.